



Touchalytics

On the Applicability of Touchscreen Input as a Behavioral Biometric for Continuous Authentication

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F7

F17 (F4, F6)

(F3, F5)


F26

F10

F18

Summary


- Users exhibit unique patterns when interacting with a touch screen
- Can this be used for authentication beyond password entry?
- Experimental study with 41 users



 30 behavioral features from 11 strokes achieve an equal error rate (EER) of 2-3% for authentication across sessions.



Extract 30 features from each stroke (see list)




Feature selection


Rel. mutual in- Feature description formation

Accuracy

- Classifiers: kNN and a one-versus-all rbf-SVM
- 3 scenarios: Intra-session, inter-session (3 min break), inter-week (1 week break)
- Separate classifiers per stroke category: horizontal, vertical (could be extended by clicks)




20.58% mid-stroke area covered 19.63% 20%-perc. pairwise velocity 17.28% mid-stroke pressure 11.06% direction of end-to-end line 10.32% stop x10.15% start x 9.45% average direction 9.43% start y 8.84% average velocity 8.61% stop y8.5% stroke duration 8.27% direct end-to-end distance 8.16% length of trajectory 7.85% 80%-perc. pairwise velocity 7.24% median velocity at last 3 pts 7.22% 50%-perc. pairwise velocity 20%-perc. pairwise acc 7.07% 6.29% ratio end-to-end dist and length of trajectory 6.08% largest deviation from end-to-end line 5.96% 80%-perc. pairwise acc 5.82% mean resultant lenght 5.42% median acceleration at first 5 points 5.39% 50%-perc. dev. from end-to-end line 5.3% inter-stroke time 5.14% 80%-perc. dev. from end-to-end line 5.04% 20%-perc. dev. from end-to-end line 5.04% 50%-perc. pairwise acc 3.44% phone orientation 3.08% mid-stroke finger orientation 0.97% up/down/left/right flag change of finger orientation 0%



Influence of refresh rate

- Take majority vote across x strokes
- No substantial improvement after
 11 strokes





Experimental pitfalls

- Different phone/OS -> different behaviour?
- Different experimenter -> different behaviour?
- Too few degrees of freedom for individual users?
- Challenge: keep inter-experiment variability low, keep intra-experiment variability large
- Influence of phone unique phone, KNN unique phone, SVM unique model, KNN inter-phone, KNN inter-phone, SVM 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 fraction of wrongly classified strokes [%]
- Influence of sample size

Data collection

- 41 users interacting with our App
- Read three Wikipedia articles
- Answer questionnaire (interrupt session) between each article
- Play two rounds of "find the difference"





Deployment

- Accuracy insufficient for standalone authentication across weeks.
- Standalone theft-detection (integrate over hours/days) in addition to PIN
- Combine with other modalities (gait, content behaviour, GPS, ...)
- Activate only in **low-risk scenarios** (detect low risk!), otherwise fall back to PIN

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download data from: http://www.mariofrank.net/touchalytics/index.html